In a Strategist article published in October last year, I discussed the workforce needed before Australia can own its first SSN. The date we should be looking at is when we might have a fully operational, sovereign SSN capability that can be deployed to defend Australia. The media and political focus on when Australia might commission its first SSN-be it new or a leased second-hand submarine-is misplaced. I think it’s an essential, if challenging, transition that should have started years ago, but didn’t. I should affirm my support for Australia’s transition to nuclear-propelled attack submarines as my detailed study, delivered to the Department of Defence in 2013, and my public advocacy implies. In the UK in 2010 a parliamentary committee found the Astute program to be almost five years late and 53% over budget. That lesson was learned the hard way in the Collins program, where we ended up with five prototypes and rectification was protracted and much more expensive that it otherwise would have been. We should expect delays and cost increases, particularly in the first of class which is essentially a prototype requiring a couple of years to evaluate and produce design fixes to be incorporated in the following submarines. This approach could ultimately meet the aim of a sovereign Australian SSN capability but it will take a significant amount of time and come with the risks all new-design submarines face. A new design would enable updated reactor and other features to be installed. This makes sense as the UK production line will close with the completion of the seventh Astute-class submarine and the US Virginia class is not well suited to Australia’s requirements. UK Defence Secretary Ben Wallace has hinted at an alternative approach: a new SSN incorporating the requirements of the AUKUS partners that would start construction in the mid-2030s. All this during a period of heightened strategic risk. The plan to ensure a continuous, sovereign, operational submarine capability under this strategy is not obvious and is yet to be explained, but what’s certain is it will take decades to achieve. Jumping into one or two nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs) that we won’t own as they will likely be leased, dependent on foreign crews, supervision, support and an overseas supply chain, none of which we control does not meet the aim of having a sovereign capability.ĪSPI’s Marcus Hellyer describes this as the ‘ damn the torpedoes’ approach. It’s what we have now, with six Collins-class boats largely dependent on Australian supply chains, with more than 90% of sustainment done by local companies-and the submarines are Australian manned and controlled. I suggest that two deployable submarines is the minimum Australia requires in the challenging times we face. Taking such a path would be a significant strategic mistake if it also trashes Australia’s existing sovereign, operational submarine capability. ‘Optimal’ here could be interpreted as ‘quickest’. The published aim of the nuclear-powered submarine taskforce is ‘ to advise government on the optimal pathway to acquiring a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines for Australia’. Their critical importance has been emphasised in multiple defence white papers, most notably since 2009 when an increase from 6 to 12 submarines was agreed. Submarines provide a unique, asymmetrical capability, giving the Australian government a range of options not offered by other platforms.
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